We examine security issuance in restated periods by firms that misreport financial statements and find that only a small percent of such firms issues securities in the restated period. Investors are misled by mistakes made by firms issuing equity more so than other restating firms at the initial announcement of misreported earnings, but are not misled by mistakes made by debt-issuing firms. Equity-issuing firms that manage earnings to beat analyst expectations experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to security issuance. Firms that restated more reports and have higher pre-mistake returns are more likely to issue equity. High leverage, firm size and number of restated periods are positively associated with the likelihood of debt issuance by restating firms.
Introduction
We study equity and debt issuance in restated periods by firms that violate Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP).
1 Prior literature suggests that one of the reasons firms violate GAAP is to reduce the cost of security issuance (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1996) , Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003) , Burns and Kedia (2006) , Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006) ). These studies find that firms that restate financial statements or are subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions for financial reporting violations (AAERs) raise more capital than control firms during violation periods. They also find that security issuance in the violation period increases the likelihood of a restatement or an AAER. They interpret these results as evidence that firms manage earnings to issue securities at better prices.
However, these results are weak evidence to suggest that restating firms violate GAAP in order to issue securities at inflated prices. For example, it is plausible that when equity and debt issuance is motivated by other considerations, it results in higher scrutiny of the firm's accounting by managers, auditors, the SEC and other market participants and thus increases the likelihood of a restatement or an AAER. Another explanation for high security issuance in the restated period is the successful market timing by management. Above mentioned studies also find that firms restating financial statements experience abnormally high performance prior to the first restated year. Therefore, abnormally high firm performance prior to misreporting can be driving both security issuance and the likelihood of misreporting. In fact, Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006) find that security issuance does not explain the likelihood of a restatement when 1 Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the first restated year or quarter and the date of restatement announcement.
the pre-misstatement price run up is included as an explanatory variable. This result is consistent with Jensen's (2005) theory of overvalued equity which suggests that overpricing leads to value destructive behavior, such as earnings management.
Furthermore, none of these papers test whether erroneous accounting prior to security issuance is associated with misvaluation in the restated period.
The main contribution of this paper is that it goes beyond the analysis of the frequency of security issuance in the restated period and tests whether restating firms experience abnormally high performance in the period after GAAP violation but before security issuance, and whether this performance is related to the magnitude of accounting misrepresentation relative to expectations. This paper is also the first to examine which restating firms are more likely to issue equity and debt.
We analyze 446 US firms that restated financial statements due to violations of GAAP during the period from January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2002. A sample of restating firms provides a unique setting for studying the impact of the quality of financial information on security issuance because ex post one observes the date and the nature of mistakes in financial statements and the date of the correction of those mistakes. We read restatement announcements to determine which financial reports were restated and the impact of restatement on net income. Our research design allows us to directly test whether overstatement of reported earnings is associated with investors over optimism about firm prospects prior to equity and debt issuance. Unlike prior studies that examined security issuance by restating firms (Burns and Kedia (2006) , Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006) ), we focus on actual security issuance rather than balance sheet proxies.
We find that only a small percent of restating firms issues securities in the restated period: 15% of restating firms issue equity and 6% issue debt in the restated period, compared with 9% of control firms issuing equity and 4% issuing debt. 2 The difference between the frequencies of security issuance is statistically significant. Although the percent of restating firms issuing securities is higher than the percent of control firms issuing securities, the number of issuances in the restated period is small to argue that security issuance is the dominant reason for violating GAAP -only 20% of firms issue either equity or debt. Therefore, 80% of restating firms were not motivated by security issuance to violate GAAP. Moreover, not all restating firms that issue equity manage earnings upward. Nineteen percent of equity issuing firms and twenty one percent of debt issuing firms understate net income prior to the issuance. If the firm understates net income prior to security issuance, it will not obtain financing at more favorable terms.
Therefore, security issuance could not be a rational motivation for downward earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that there is no strong connection between the act of restatement and security issuance.
If some firms violate GAAP to reduce financing costs, then we should observe positive association between abnormal return at the announcement of earnings and the mistake, adjusted for expected earnings. We test this proposition by examining whether investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings prior to equity and debt issuance.
Following Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) we decompose reported earnings into correctly stated component and mistake and examine abnormal returns at the initial 2 Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement.
earnings as a function of these numbers relative to expectations. Expectations are measured as consensus analyst forecasts. We find that investors attach the same valuation coefficient to the erroneous component of earnings as they do to the true earnings.
Investors are more misled by mistakes made by equity issuing firms prior to the issuance, but are not misled by mistakes prior to debt issuance. For equity-issuing firms that manage earnings to beat analyst expectations abnormal returns persist beyond announcement window -such firms experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to security issuance. Interestingly, for equity issuing firms there is little evidence of abnormal performance before the mistakes are made, which suggests that the abnormal performance prior to equity issuance is caused by earnings management.
Overall our results suggest that a small number of firms that violate GAAP and subsequently issue equity mislead investors.
We also examine which types of firms in the cross-section are most likely to use earnings management to issue equity and debt. We find that restating firms that issue equity are larger in market value terms than non-issuing firms, have higher pre-mistake return, make smaller downward revisions of net income and restate more reports.
Restating firms that issue debt are considerably larger, more highly levered, and make smaller downward revisions of net income than non-issuing firms and firms issuing equity. Restating firms that issue debt restate more reports than non-issuing firms, but not firms issuing equity.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first paper to examine whether firm performance is abnormal subsequent to GAAP violations before equity and debt issuances and whether such performance is associated with the magnitude of the restatement. Prior literature assumed that if the firm issues securities in the restated period, the issuance follows the period of abnormal performance induced by earnings management (Burns and Kedia (2006) , Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006) , Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Shivakumar (2000) , and
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) among others show that abnormal accruals is a poor measure of earnings management prior to security issuance. 4 The advantage of testing the earnings management hypothesis using a sample of restatements is that ex post one observes the details of accounting misreporting. However, accrual management is a more common practice, which does not impose the large costs of financial misrepresentation that are associated with restatements. Therefore, while this study extends the prior literature that tested the earnings management hypothesis using accruals, its results are not directly comparable to that stream of literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and outlines hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents results and Section 5 concludes.
Related literature and hypotheses
A firm is required to file a prior period adjustment of financial statements whenever it discovers material discrepancies in previously filed financial statements.
Restatements result in significant negative market reaction (Akhigbe, Kudla and Madura (2005) and Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) ) that is spilled over to firms in the same industry (Akhigbe and Madura (2008)). Markets anticipate financial statement the post-event period (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b) and Rangan (1998 ), Friedlan (1994 , DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001) ), Erickson and Wang (1998), Christie and Zimmerman (1994) , and Urcan and Kieschnick (2006) ). 4 Shivakumar (2000) points out four problems with using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management around large events such as SEOs, IPOs, and mergers. First, such events are frequently associated with unusually large changes to working capital, independent of any earnings management. Second, many studies estimate accruals from balance sheet changes in working capital, not by taking them from cash flow statements. Third, accrual models commonly used to estimate earnings management are mis-specified. Fourth, such events frequently involve substantial expenses that might be unpaid prior to the event and hence are accrued at the balance date, resembling income increasing discretionary accruals.
restatements as early as half way through the restated period (Bardos, Golec, Harding (2011) raise more funds in the first misstated year than control firms matched on size and bookto-market. 5 The paper does not examine security issuance beyond the first misstated year.
These studies interpreted the result that restating firms issue more external funds than control samples as evidence in favor of the earnings management hypothesis, i.e., firms manage earnings to issue securities at more favorable prices. There are several problems with such inference. First, there are other potential explanations for the 5 In a related paper, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) studied 92 firms that were subject to SEC enforcement actions for financial reporting violations (AAERs) between 1978 and 1990. They report that the main motivation as cited by the SEC for earnings management was to issue securities at inflated prices. They also find that the AAER sample raises more external funds than control sample. The paper did not investigate whether or not funds were issued at a lower cost than they would have been in the absence of earnings management.
observed result. It has been shown by the same studies that misstatements follow periods of stock price run-up. Therefore, a higher number of issuances by restating firms in a restated period can simply be the result of a manager's ability to time the market. Indeed many studies find that firms issue equity when their shares are overpriced (Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) , (Dittmar and Thakor (2007) , Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Baker and Wurgler (2002) , and Burch, Christie, and Nanda (2004)). Another plausible explanation for this result is that firms that issue securities are more likely to restate as they face greater scrutiny by the SEC, auditors and investors than non-issuing firms. Third, these papers did not test whether erroneous reporting that leads to restatements inflates security prices prior to security issuance and therefore allows management to issue securities at more favorable prices.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing whether material mistakes in financial statements allow restating firms to reduce financing costs. We study a sample of firms that restated financial statements during 1997-2002. For these firms we can ex post identify financial reports which contained mistakes as well as the size of the mistakes (see Figure 1 ). We can also determine if the firms issued securities in the restated period. If security issuance at favorable prices is one of the main motivations for misreporting earnings as suggested by prior studies, then one should observe a higher frequency of security issuance by restating firms relative to control firms in the restated period. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Restating firms issue more equity and debt than control firms.
We examine the number of equity and debt issuances in the restated period relative to a sample of control firms. Unlike prior studies that use the sum of funds raised through equity and debt obtained from Compustat, we use security issuance data from Securities Data Corporation, which allows us to determine the precise timing of the issuance.
As noted earlier, even if hypothesis 1 is supported, this would not imply that material mistakes in financial statements reduced financing costs of restating firms. The likelihood of security issuance and the likelihood of restatement can be driven by the same variable, such as overvaluation in the pre-mistake period. Security issuance in the restated period can increase the likelihood of restatement due to additional scrutiny of financial statements by management, auditors, regulators and other market participants.
To test whether misreporting allows restating firms to issue securities at more favorable prices, we examine whether material mistakes of issuing firms result in misvaluation. If investors are misled by material mistakes in reported earnings then they would price the error component of earnings the same way as they price the true earnings.
For example, if the error puts the firm in line with expectations, then there should be no abnormal performance at the announcement of earnings. Similarly, if overstated earnings cause the firm to beat expectations that may generate positive abnormal performance.
Most of the action will take place at the announcement of earnings.
A well established result in the literature is that earnings announcement returns are positively related to unexpected earnings (Ball and Brown (1968) , Collins and Kothari (1989) 
The coefficient b 1 is called the earnings response coefficient (ERC).
Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) study whether investors are misled by misstated earnings by estimating whether investors attach the same earnings response coefficient to the misstated earnings as they do to the true component of earnings.
Specifically, they estimate the following equation:
where M t (MISTAKE) is the amount by which earnings are misstated, is market adjusted return for a 3 day window (-1; +1) relative to the earnings announcement on day zero. They find that coefficient is positive and equal to , suggesting that investors are fooled by mistakes in financial statements and treat misstated component of earnings the same way that they treat the correctly stated component. If firms violate GAAP to reduce financing costs, then we should observe positive association between abnormal return at the announcement of earnings and the mistake, adjusted for expected earnings.
H2: There is a positive association between abnormal earnings announcement returns and mistake in reported earnings for firms issuing equity and debt.
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the following two models:
Equity (Debt) is a dummy that equals one for quarters in the restated period preceding equity (debt) issuance. For example, if a firm restated financial statements for 1999 and 2000 fiscal years and issued equity in November of 1999, then Equity will equal one for the first three quarters of 1999 (provided that the 3 rd quarter is announced prior to equity issuance announcement). . We estimate equations (3) and (4) using OLS regression. For each firm, we include all quarters in the restated period -in this period MISTAKE is non zero.
To provide a benchmark for the estimation in the restated period, for each firm we include quarters for two years preceding the restated period and cluster errors by firm. As a result, usual performance of the firm in pre-restatement period is used as its own control. Clustering standard errors by firm also corrects for cross-sectional and timeseries dependence (Petersen (2009)). 
H3: If SUE<0 and MISTAKE>SUE, issuing firms will experience abnormal performance in the restated period before security issuance.
To test hypothesis 3 we examine abnormal returns in the restated period until security issuance (period (Mistake, Issuance)) relative to several benchmarks: usual performance of the firm itself, control firm and the market. Lastly, we examine which types of firms in the cross-section are most likely to use earnings management to issue equity and debt. We also study whether there is a difference in earnings management between debt versus equity issuance. As discussed in the introduction and the result section, only a small percent of restating firms issue equity and debt. Because of the small sample size, we focus only on a few key characteristics to preserve the degrees of freedom in multivariate analysis.
An established result in the literature is that firms issue equity after periods of run-up in stock prices (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Prior literature has also shown that restating firms make mistakes in financial statements following periods of abnormally high performance (Burns and Kedia (2007), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006) ).
Therefore, we should expect firms with better pre-mistake performance to be more likely to issue equity than debt. 6 Calculation of abnormal returns is discussed in detail in section 4.4.
H4: Firms with better pre-mistake performance are more likely to issue equity.
Several studies find that firms close to violating lending covenants manage earnings (Sweeney (1994) , DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) ), and Dechow et al. (1996) ).
These studies suggest that avoidance of penalties associated with the violations of debt covenants is a motivation to manage earnings. A firm would manage earnings to issue new debt if earnings management allows the firm to obtain debt at more favorable terms.
A firm that meets restrictive covenants can obtain more favorable financing. Prior studies use leverage as a proxy for the pressure firms feel to manage earnings (Richardson et al (2002), Burns and Kedia (2007)).
H5: Firms with higher leverage are more likely to issue debt.
We examine whether firms that issue equity and debt differ from non issuing firms in terms of restatement characteristics. If issuing firms make larger mistakes, this would suggest that they have a longer distance to their earnings threshold. Issuing firms are more likely to have longer restated period because the likelihood of any event is greater during a longer time period. We also control for firm size in multivariate analysis.
Data
We collected a sample of US firms that announced restatements of financial statements between January 1997 and June 2002. We searched Lexis-Nexis database using key words "restatement", "restat", "revis", "adjust", "error" and "responding to guidance from the SEC". We crossed checked search results with the sample released by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Unlike the GAO sample, we excluded restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. After identifying the sample of companies announcing restatements, we searched for the originally filed and restated financial statements on Lexis-Nexis (Forms 10-K/A(s) and Forms 10-Q/A(s)). The following data was collected from restatement announcements and original and restated financial statements: date of the announcement of restatement, years and quarters restated, original and restated net income.
The search resulted in 536 restatements made by 496 firms. We imposed several other filters. Some firms restated more than once during the sample period. In several cases restated periods of multiple restatements by the same firm overlapped. To avoid double counting security issuance, we deleted 29 restatements that had overlapping restated periods. The later of the two restatements with overlapping restated periods was deleted. Second, we deleted 20 restatements for which the impact on net income was zero or could not be identified. Third, we deleted 6 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).
Because REITs are required to pay out 90% of their reported net income in dividends, they may have different considerations when deciding whether to issue equity or debt. Return data is from CRSP. Financial data was obtained from Compustat. Information on equity and debt issuance is taken from the Securities Data Corporation database (SDC Platinum).
[Insert Table 1 about here] are the closest in size and book-to-market and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Market value and book-tomarket ratios of restating firms are measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement. Table 2 , Panel C compares characteristics of restating and control firms using 2-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The samples do not differ in terms of size and book-tomarket, which indicates a successful match. They also do not differ in terms of the book value of assets. Restating firms are more highly levered than control firms. On average, restating firms have a capital structure that has 2% more debt.
Results

Descriptive Statistics
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Equity and debt issuance
Results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 show that restating firms issue more equity and debt in the restated period than non-restating firms. [Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 shows the same statistics for debt issuance in the restated period. 7 We find that while fewer restating firms issue debt than equity in the restated period (6.28%), many firms raise debt more than once in restated period and raise more funds per issuance. Similar pattern is seen for control firms. There are more debt issuances in restated period by restating firms than control firms. However, the difference in the 7 Number of debt issuances figures in [Insert Table 4 about here]
Interestingly, not all restating firms that issue equity manage earnings upward.
We find that 13 out of 68 restating firms that issued equity in the restated period understated net income; and 6 out of 28 debt issuing firms understated net income. We call firms that understated net income and as a result had to revise net income upward as upward restatements. If the firm understates net income prior to security issuance, it will not obtain financing at more favorable terms. Therefore, security issuance could not be a rational reason for downward earnings management. We focus our analysis on 55 equity issuing and 22 debt issuing firms that restate net income downward (downward restatements).
Market reaction to initial announcement of misstated earnings
In this section we test hypothesis 2 by analyzing market reaction to the initial announcement of misstated earnings. Significance of the coefficient on Mistake for equity issuing firms indicates that investors are misled by mistakes of such firms. Interestingly, we find that coefficient on the interaction of SUE and Equity dummy is positive and significant. This shows that investors react more strongly to surprises in correctly stated component of earnings of equity issuing firms. This result suggests that equity issuing firms are overvalued.
Similarly, we find that the coefficient on the interaction of Mistake and Equity dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that investors are more misled by mistakes made by equity issuing firms then other restating firms. is not significant). We also find that the coefficient on SUE for debt issuing firms is not significant, suggesting that our sample might be too small to test predictions for debt issuing firms. Table 5 Panel F shows regression results for the downward restatements. All results are similar to those for the full sample (Panel E).
Overall, we find support for hypothesis 2 for equity but not for debt issuing firms.
Abnormal returns in the restated period before equity and debt issuance
To test hypothesis 3 we examine abnormal returns in the restated period until security issuance (period (Mistake, Issuance)). This period begins after the restated earnings have been reported to the market (day +2) and end two days prior to the announcement of the security offer. For firms that are missing earnings announcement date, the start date is calculated as the end of the quarter plus 29 days, which is the average lag between the end of the quarter and the reporting date for our sample. we also estimate market model parameters for 250 days starting on day -5 relative to mistake. Table 6 shows that the results depend on the estimation period for market model parameters. Therefore, we estimated two more measures of abnormal performance: market adjusted abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns.
Mistake) year, (1
CAR
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as
The advantage of using this return is that it does not require the estimation of the market model parameters and therefore leads to fewer lost observations. The drawback is that market adjusted return does not account for the market risk.
Buy-and-hold return ( ) over period τ for firm i is calculated as the geometric return. represents the actual experience of an investor who passively holds a sample firm for period τ . 
where , ( i E BHR τ is the τ period expected return for security i. We use two estimates of expected earnings. The first proxy is the performance of restating firm itself one year before the start of the restated period. The second proxy is the return on a size and book-to-market matched peer firm in the same industry (two digit SIC code) as the restating firm. 9 We follow Lyon, Barber and Tsai's (1999) approach to selecting among possible control firms. They showed that control firm approach yields well specified results when control firms are matched on size and book to market. 10 Size is measured by the market value of equity. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of equity book value to equity market value. Both size and book to market are calculated one year prior to restatement. We eliminate all restating firms from the pool of potential control firms.
We also require control firms to have CRSP data at least one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement.
First, we calculate returns in the period (Mistake, Issuance) for all firms issuing equity and debt (Table 6 , Panels A and B). This supports hypothesis 3 for equity issuing firms -firms that manage earnings to beat analyst expectation y issuance. respectively. Panel C compares these sub-samples using two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. We find that resta value and return one year before the start of the restated period. They have the same book value, leverage and book-to-market ratio compared to firms that do not issue securities in restated period.
Characteristics of issuing firms
We find that firms that issue equity in restated period inflate net income less through erroneous accounting than non-issuing firms. This suggests that restating firms has shorter distance to the benchmark they are trying to meet. Despite this, as we showed in section 4.3, market reacts more strongly to surprises and mistakes made by restating irms issuing debt with available data for calculating SUE, SUE is negative. For 9 firms with negative SUE Mistake is greater than SUE. Table 7 , Panel E compares this sub-sample to that of restating firms that do not issue securities. Restating firms that issue debt are much lar mistakes and have longer restated periods than non-issuing sub-sample. As in the case of equity issuing firms, the magnitude of the mistake is smaller for debt-issuing firms than for non-issuing sub-sample. Unlike equity issuing firms, debt issuing firms do not exhibit positive stock returns in pre-mistake period. Firms that issue equity make larger mistakes in net income than firms that issue debt. Since higher net income is more likely to have a greater positive impact on equity price than on debt price, this result is consistent with managers inflating earnings to obtain better financi r hypothesis 4: equity issu performance than non-issuing firms and debt-issuing firms. We also find support for hypothesis 5: debt issuing firms have higher leverage than both equity-issuing and non-issuing firms. In results not tabulated we consider other firm and restatement characteristics and add them to models 1 and 2 one at a time. To control for growth opportunities we include book-to-market and sales growth. Firms with higher growth prospects should be more likely to issue securities. However, ro we control for pr icantly different from zero.
Conclusion
Increasing number of firms restate financial statements (GAO (2002) (2004)). It has been suggested that firms manage earnings, both within GAAP and outside of GAAP, to issue securities at favorable prices. Such practices mislead i se them to overvalue security issuance. However, as investors learn the true value of earnings, they revalue firms that manage earnings downwards. This conjecture was called the earnings management hypothesis by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) . This paper tests earnings management hypothesis using a sample of firms restating financial statements during the period of January 1997-June 2002. We find that while restating firms issue more equity and debt than control firms, the number of issuances is small. Moreover, about 20% of equity and dent issuing firms manage net income ted period. They do not exhibit any abnormal performance prior to debt issuanc ssue debt are considerably larger, more highly uity. Restating firms that issue debt restate more reports than non-issuing firms, but not firms issuing equity.
Overall our results indicate that only a few restating firms that issue equity obtain financing at better terms.
downward prior to security issuance, which is inconsistent with the earnings management hypothesis. This result implies that security issuance is not the dominant reason for violating GAAP for more than 80% of restating firms.
Restating firms that issue equity outperform the market and the control firms subsequent to GAAP violation and prior to equity issuance and perform better one year prior to GAAP violation. Earnings management hypothesis is not supported for firms that issue debt in resta e in restated period and one year before mistake. In conclusion, overall results suggest limited support for earnings management hypothesis for a sample of firms violating GAAP.
Restating firms that issue equity are larger in market value terms than non-issuing firms, have higher pre-mistake return, make smaller downward revisions of net income and restate more reports. Restating firms that i levered, and make smaller downward revisions of net income than non-issuing firms and firms issuing eq were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases using key words "restatement" "restat" "revis" "adjust" "error" and "responding to guidance from the SEC" during the period January 1, 1997 -June 30, 2002. Further details about restatement were found in original and restated financial statements. Resulting sample was cross-checked with the sample released by Government Accountability Office. Unlike the GAO sample. We excluded restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the originally reported net income. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured one year prior to restatement announcement. Downward (upward) restatements are defined as restatements revising net income downward (upward) at restatement announcement. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year and the number of common shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of total common equity. Leverage is calculated as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of total common equity to the market value. Panel B shows descriptive statistics for the sample of control firms. Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel C presents Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-tailed). *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year and the number of common shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of total common equity. Leverage is calculated as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of total common equity to the market value. Buy-and-hold return before mistake is the daily buy-andhold return estimated one year before the start of the restated period. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the originally reported net income. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured on year prior to restatement announcement. Number of periods restated is in years. Comparison of sub-samples is performed using Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-tailed). *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. (Debt) , is equal to 1 if the firm issued equity (debt) and zero otherwise. Buy-and-hold return before mistake is the daily buy-and-hold return estimated one year before the start of the restated period. Leverage is calculated one year prior to the year of restatement announcement as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured on year prior to restatement announcement. Number of periods restated is in years. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year one year prior to the year of restatement announcement and the number of common shares outstanding. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
